In the last post I wrote about one of the most historic inter-governmental landmark decisions: At the ‘Biodiversity’ COP (COP15) 200 countries had agreed on 4 Goals and 23 Targets. I had hence a closer look at precisely those 23 Targets and the specificity of the measures they contain.
It goes without saying though that the interesting piece is the enforcement and implementation mechanisms of the mentioned agreement. Up to this point, everything and all are in essence pledges, that countries may officially sign up to but still potentially choose to ignore, remain inactive on, or indeed choose to kick the can down the road. As the 2015 Paris Agreement (for climate) shows only too well.
Hence, the focus of this article is: How exactly – if at all – will the goals and progress measures reached at ‘Biodiversity’ COP15 in December 2022 be enforced and tracked?
Insight 1: Enforcement Mechanisms – What did (or not) work for the Paris Climate Agreement works (or not) for the Vancouver Biodiversity Agreement
Indeed, you read that correctly. The enforcement and progress measurement mechanisms are – by and large – the exact same ones as those outlined for the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement. Details can be read up in this PDF file.
- The upside: Possibly thanks to that we have a 2022 Vancouver Biodiversity Agreement at all.
- The downside: … We’re off the track for the climate trajectory. So the mechanism does not work particularly well.
Specifically, the introductory points of the above linked PDF Document outline how implementation and progress is supposed to work [emphasis added by the author]:
[…] national biodiversity strategies and action plans are the main instrument for implementing the Convention at the national level and that national reports are the main instrument for monitoring and reviewing the implementation of the Convention and the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework, […]
Source
Superficially, it is stated that
- 1(a) National biodiversity strategies and action plans, revised or updated in alignment with the Kunming-Montreal global biodiversity framework and its goals and targets as the main vehicle for implementation of the global biodiversity framework, including national targets communicated in a standardized format by the sixteenth meeting of the Conference of the Parties;
- 1(b) National reports submitted in 2026 and 2029, including the headline and as appropriate other indicators adopted in decision 15/5;
These are, by and large, the exact mechanisms that the Paris Agreement implemented for climate, and that are at the centre of the yearly Climate COPs.
[*Sarcasm Warning*] We can therefore expect a similar suspense drama every year also ahead, during and post upcoming biodiversity COPs, with COP16 being the first episode of that series.
Insight 2: The similarity to the Climate COP does not stop at the implementation and measurement ‘framework’.
The (same) mechanisms indeed also apply to planning, reporting and updating of plans – in alignment, or not, with the COP15 framework targets
Now granted, the wording does, or may, differ to an extent, but in my view that is mostly … cosmetics?
The exact wording of paragraph 6, 7, 8 and 9 read like (again at origin from the above PDF file) can be consulted on the website of the COP website itself.
Insight 3: Planing, reporting and updating requires a baseline. What about baselines?
Prior, during and post COP15, countries were asked to submit National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans (NBSAPs).
But what is NBSAP?
The NBSAP is a process by which countries can plan to address the threats to their biodiversity. As such they are the principal instruments for the implementation of the Convention both at the national and at the global level, and they are increasingly relevant to other biodiversity-related conventions and agreements which contribute to the implementation of the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020 and its Aichi Targets. While the concept and understanding of an NBSAP continues to evolve, it remains relevant as shorthand for implementation of Article 6 of the Convention.
Source: Convention on Biological Diversity, NBSAP Capacity Building Modules, NBSAP Capacity Building Module 1 “An Introduction to NBSAPs” (revised in 2011).
Already ahead of COP15’s framework agreement, and since the Aichi Agreement in 2011, a range of countries had submitted NBSAPs. The list is available here.
If COP15 is considered a landmark agreement, one would assume that all subsequent NBSAP would be landmark versions thereof.
While, as at writing, only 3 months have passed since the Vancouver agreement, it is nonetheless sobering to see that just one country – Spain (English summary, Spanish original): one that has a rather sketchy track record on Biodiversity and related protection efforts – has submitted a post-COP15 NBSAP.
Conclusion:
The COP15 Biodiversity agreement is – by and large, and for the very same reasons – facing the identical challenges as the outcome of the Paris’ Agreement Climate COP21.
This is little surprise. For a couple of reasons:
- Global North countries are by and large not willing to assume accountability for the damage done.
- Due to historic reasons, Global North countries are at the same time the once with the largest amounts of monetary assets – and unwilling to invest those into remediation and adaption of other nations.
-
Globalisation my have happened – but each nation functions on very
short-sighted views. A significant underlying reason for that is,
and no surprise here, that the respective electorate consistently
puts their own skin first on the short-term. In other words: most
individuals on the globe are totally and entirely incapable to
realise how much skin in the game they have if the time horizon is
longer than say 5 years. Systemic thinking and impact recognition is
a very, very rare capability. One largely absent from political
discussions, and indeed it seems from the education entire
populations are equipped with.
- Case in point: the huge upheavals across Europe, in just about any country, when it comes to pension system reforms, as well as to reforms of subsidies related to fuel for road transport and agriculture.
